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Cross-cultural psychiatry and validity in DSM-5 
Abstract 
The latest edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, DSM-5 
explicitly addresses the possibility of cultural variation in mental illness. Among other things, it 
contains a ‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’ which describes nine common conditions 
including khyal cap, or ‘wind attacks,’ a syndrome found among Cambodians in the United States 
and Cambodia. The chapter examines three possible models of the relation between such cultural 
idioms and the ambition, for DSM-5, of being a valid taxonomy of universal forms of mental illness. 
The models are: 1) an underlying universal ‘pathogenic’ component overlain by a variable 
‘pathoplastic’ cultural shape. 2) a pathogenic-only model. 3) a pathoplastic-only model. None, 
however, reconciles the DSM’s simultaneous ambitions of validity and cultural sensitivity and 
suggest that the ‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’ remains an afterthought in tension with 
the rest of the taxonomy. 
Introduction 
The fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, DSM-5, 
puts greater emphasis than previous editions on cross-cultural factors affecting mental illness [APA 
2013]. Diagnostic criteria have been revised to take account of cross-cultural variation, there is a 
more specific cultural formulation and a glossary lists nine ‘Cultural Concepts of Distress’. But the 
DSM does not present a clear view of whether it assumes that mental illnesses are universal and 
apply across all cultures or whether they can be specific and local to particular cultures. Nor does it 
give an account of the relation of the cultural concepts to the rest of the taxonomy of disorders or 
the extent to which they are put forward as valid diagnoses. 
The first section of this chapter outlines the ways that cultural factors have been included in 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual DSM-5 [APA, 2013]. It introduces one particular example: khyal 
cap or wind attacks, a syndrome found among people living in Cambodia. The second section sets 
out three possible views of the nature of such cultural concepts of distress. On one view, which 
dates back to the German psychiatrist Karl Birnbaum, an underlying universal ‘pathogenic’ 
component is overlain by a variable ‘pathoplastic’ cultural shape [Birnbaum 1923]. This combination 
suggests the conceptual possibility of two single factor models in which either factor is set to zero: 
pathogenic-only and pathoplastic-only. The final section returns to the example of khyal cap. On 
inspection, none of the three models helps accommodate its own incompatible aetiological theory 
with the biomedical view of the rest of the DSM. This suggests that the very idea of cultural concepts 
of distress fits uneasily with the aspirations to validity of the rest of DSM-5. 
Cultural factors in DSM-5 
The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual DSM-IV introduced guidelines for a 
‘cultural formulation’ and a ‘Glossary of Culture-Bound Syndromes’ [APA, 1994]. The cultural 
formulation ‘supplement[ed] the nomothetic or standardized diagnostic ratings with an idiographic 
statement, emphasizing the patient’s personal experience and the corresponding cultural reference 
group’ [Mezzich et al., 1999; P459]. The ‘culture-bound syndromes’ were described as ‘locality-
specific patterns of aberrant behavior and troubling experience that may or may not be linked to a 
particular DSM-IV diagnostic category’ [APA, 2000; P898]. 
These new elements in the DSM reflected, firstly, awareness of the need for it to address growing 
cultural diversity within North America since ‘[i]mmigrants bring with them their own indigenous 
patterns and conceptions of mental illness, some of which are structured into cultural syndromes’ 
[Guarnaccia and Rogler, 1999: 1322]. Secondly, the DSM needed to contain cross-cultural material 
because of its increasing global use.  
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DSM-5 offers a more extended treatment of cultural factors in psychiatric diagnosis than DSM-IV 
[APA, 2013]. Throughout the manual, diagnostic criteria have been revised to reflect cross-cultural 
variations in presentations of disorders. The discussion of the ‘Cultural Formulation’ in section III 
now sets out a semi-structured interview. In the Appendix, there is a ‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts 
of Distress’ which describes nine common conditions. The Introduction warns how cultural factors 
might affect diagnosis and prognosis and thus should be investigated in a cultural formulation [APA, 
2013; P14]. The manual suggests that culture can affect any of the following: 
• The boundaries between normality and pathology for different types of behaviour.  
• Vulnerability and suffering (for example, by amplifying fears that maintain panic disorder).  
• The stigma of, or the support for, mental illness.  
• The availability of coping strategies.  
• The acceptance or rejection of a diagnosis and treatments, affecting the course of illness and 
recovery.  
• The conduct of the clinical encounter itself and how this affects the accuracy of diagnosis, 
acceptance of treatment, prognosis and clinical outcomes. 
The Introduction to DSM-5 also summarises (in fact at greater length than the later discussion of the 
cultural formulation in the main text) three distinct ways that culture can impact on diagnoses [APA, 
2013]. The single idea of culture-bound syndromes from DSM-IV is replaced by three notions: 
cultural syndromes, cultural idioms of distress and cultural explanations (or perceived causes) of 
illnesses (or symptoms). It is worth quoting the summary in full: 
1. Cultural syndrome is a cluster or group of co-occurring, relatively invariant symptoms 
found in a specific cultural group, community, or context (e.g. ataque de nervios). The 
syndrome may or may not be recognized as an illness within the culture (e.g. it might be 
labelled in various ways), but such cultural patterns of distress and features of illness may 
nevertheless be recognizable by an outside observer. 
2. Cultural idiom of distress is a linguistic term, phrase, or way of talking about suffering 
among individuals of a cultural group (e.g. similar ethnicity and religion) referring to shared 
concepts of pathology and ways of expressing, communicating, or naming essential features 
of distress (e.g. kufiingisisa). An idiom of distress need not be associated with specific 
symptoms, syndromes, or perceived causes. It may be used to convey a wide range of 
discomfort, including everyday experiences, subclinical conditions, or suffering due to social 
circumstances rather than mental disorders. For example, most cultures have common 
bodily idioms of distress used to express a wide range of suffering and concerns. 
3. Cultural explanation or perceived cause is a label, attribution, or feature of an explanatory 
model that provides a culturally conceived etiology or cause for symptoms, illness, or 
distress (e.g. maladi moun). Causal explanations may be salient features of folk 
classifications of disease used by laypersons or healers. [ibid: P14] 
Although the authors distinguish between these different ideas, they concede that the same 
elements may play a role in all three categories. For example, depression is used as an idiom of 
distress whether of: 1) an illness or pathology, or 2) normal but significant sadness. It is also 
recognised as a mental illness syndrome gathering together a number of symptoms. Finally, it is 
taken to be the cause of those symptoms. Just as depression can play the role of syndrome, idiom of 
distress and explanation, so can other concepts local to other cultures.  
Given this complication, although the ‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’ describes nine 
common cultural syndromes, the concepts described may also play a role as idioms of distress and 
purported explanations or causes of experiences. The ‘Cultural Concepts of Distress’ described are 
khyal attacks or khyal cap, ataque de nervios (‘attack of nerves’), dhat (‘semen loss’), kufungisisa 
(‘thinking too much’), maladi moun (‘humanly caused illness’) nervios (‘nerves’), shenjing shuairuo 
(‘weakness of the nervous system’), susto (‘fright’), taijin kyofusho (‘interpersonal fear disorder’). 
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Each is related to similar but different concepts found in other cultures and also to the illness 
categories set out in the main body of DSM-5. Khyal cap, for example, is linked to panic disorder. 
In the years leading up the publication of DSM-5, much emphasis was placed on the attempt to 
increase the validity of psychiatric diagnostic categories. The book A Research Agenda for DSM-V 
which comprises a series of papers on different aspects of DSM-5 starts with this thought [Kupfer et 
al 2002]. 
Those of us who have worked for several decades to improve the reliability of our diagnostic 
criteria are now searching for new approaches to an understanding of etiological and 
pathophysiological mechanisms—an understanding that can improve the validity of our 
diagnoses and the consequent power of our preventive and treatment interventions. 
[Kupfer et al 2002: Pxv] 
This passage expresses the worry that whilst work had been done to improve the reliability of DSM-
III and DSM-IV, not enough attention had been paid to the validity of the syndromes within 
psychiatric taxonomy. This aim for the rest of DSM-5 suggests the following question about the 
‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’: What is its relation to the rest of the taxonomy, to the 
other diagnostic categories set out in the main body of the book? There seem to be three general 
possibilities. 1) The status of the glossary and the main body might be intended to the same and 
both aim at validity: describing real universal mental illness categories. 2) The status of both could 
be intended to be the same and all diagnostic categories be thought to be culturally specific. 3) The 
appendix might be intended to have a distinct lesser status, not aimed at validity but rather charting 
the theoretical errors of other cultures.  
The second option is the most conceptually fraught. It requires, not just that the rates or prevalence 
of an illness that can apply universally varies between cultures but rather that the validity of a 
diagnosis, the very idea of an illness, is in some sense true only of or for a particular culture. The 
paradox of such relativism is that it is unclear that one can assert its general truth. But asserting its 
merely relative truth does not seem enough. To adopt this view of the main body of the DSM is to 
adopt a self-consciously ironic or relativist view. One possibility – obviously not taken in DSM-5 – is 
that some diagnoses from the main section belong in the appendix. Perhaps anorexia nervosa is 
somehow specific to European and North American cultures whilst schizophrenia is universal. So can 
the aim of cultural sensitivity exemplified in the Cultural Formulation and the articulation of cultural 
idioms of distress go hand in hand with the scientific ambitions of twenty-first century psychiatry? 
Or are the two ventures somehow in tension? 
These general questions can be illustrated through one example. One of the nine items in the 
‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’ is khyal cap which is described thus. 
Khyal cap  
‘Khyal attacks’ (khyal cap), or ‘wind attacks,’ is a syndrome found among Cambodians in the 
United States and Cambodia. Common symptoms include those of panic attacks, such as 
dizziness, palpitations, shortness of breath, and cold extremities, as well as other symptoms 
of anxiety and autonomic arousal (e.g., tinnitus and neck soreness). Khyal attacks include 
catastrophic cognitions centered on the concern that khyal (a windlike substance) may rise 
in the body—along with blood—and cause a range of serious effects (e.g., compressing the 
lungs to cause shortness of breath and asphyxia; entering the cranium to cause tinnitus, 
dizziness, blurry vision, and a fatal syncope). Khyal attacks may occur without warning, but 
are frequently brought about by triggers such as worrisome thoughts, standing up (i.e., 
orthostasis), specific odors with negative associations, and agoraphobic type cues like going 
to crowded spaces or riding in a car. Khyal attacks usually meet panic attack criteria and may 
shape the experience of other anxiety and trauma- and stress or related disorders. Khyal 
attacks may be associated with considerable disability.  
Related conditions in other cultural contexts: Laos (pen lom), Tibet (srog rlunggi nad), Sri 
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Lanka (vata), and Korea (hwa byung).  
Related conditions in DSM-5: Panic attack, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 
agoraphobia, posttraumatic stress disorder, illness anxiety disorder. [ibid: P834] 
The belief that illness can be caused by a dysfunction of a wind-like substance, described using the 
same word as for wind, seems to be common in parts of Asia [Hinton et al., 2010; P245]. Khyal is 
thought normally to flow alongside the blood supply and can pass out of the body through the skin. 
But the flow can become disturbed ‘surging upward in the body toward the head, often 
accompanied by blood, to cause many symptoms and possibly various bodily disasters’ [ibid: P245]. 
It is thought to be caused by, for example, ‘worry, standing up, a change in the weather and any kind 
of fright, such as being startled or awakening from a nightmare [ibid: P246]. Local treatments include 
dragging a coin along the skin giving rise to characteristic abrasions. 
To ‘coin,’ the person dabs the tip of a finger in khyal ointment (preing kenlaa), a Vaseline-like 
substance containing camphor and menthol, and then drags the fingertip along the skin to 
create a streak 5 or 6 inches in length. Next a coin is grasped by the fingers and the edge 
pushed down slightly against the skin at the proximal beginning of the streak; the coin is 
then dragged outward along the streak of khyal ointment. This is then repeated. [ibid: P271] 
Despite the overlap of symptoms, it is clear that the framework of beliefs that surround the 
conception of khyal attack differs from that of biomedical psychiatry. What then is its supposed 
status in DSM-5? This question calls for a general understanding of the ways in which culture might 
affect concepts of illness and whether any model can simultaneously aim for validity whilst 
admitting cultural variation. Thus the next section will outline three general ways of thinking about 
the cultural dependence of mental illness categories, the possible role of cultural formulation and 
hence the different cultural concepts of distress in DSM-5.  
Three models of cultural concepts of distress 
A two-factor pathogenic-pathoplastic model 
One way to understand how culture affects mental illness would be to think of the expression of 
mental illness as the result of two-factors: an invariant endogenous factor and a local cultural 
appearance: ‘pathogenic’ versus ‘pathoplastic’ factors [Birnbaum 1923]. The psychiatrist and 
anthropologist Roland Littlewood stresses the connection between this distinction and the long-
standing distinction in psychiatry between the form and content of mental illness. 
To deal with variations in the symptoms between individuals, while maintaining the idea of a 
uniform disease, clinical psychiatry still makes a distinction between the essential 
pathogenic determinants of a mental disorder – those biological processes which are held to 
be necessary and sufficient to cause it – and the pathoplastic personal and cultural 
variations in the pattern. Those two are still distinguished in everyday clinical practice by the 
particularly nineteenth century German distinction between form and content. [Littlewood, 
2002: P5] 
This distinction needs handling with some care. Littlewood suggests that the pathogenic factor is a 
necessary and sufficient cause of mental disorder. But the notion of cause suggests a state distinct 
from the mental disorder it causes. Further, the requirement of a sufficient cause is difficult to attain 
as causes are only sufficient relative to an assumed causal field [Mackie, 1993]. The connection to 
the distinction of form and content suggests a better interpretation is not what causes mental 
disorder but what constitutes it. The pathogenic factor is then the set of essential properties of 
disorders, the properties that are necessary and sufficient for a state to count as a disorder. The 
pathoplastic factor is the contingent variation of inessential properties of the disorder. 
Littlewood reports that in the biomedical view of psychiatry the pathogenic factor is a biological 
process. In other words, the essential features of mental disorder can be described in biological 
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terms. Such a view fits an influential analysis of mental disorder in general articulated and defended 
by Jerome Wakefield [Wakefield, 1999]. According to Wakefield, a disorder is a harmful dysfunction, 
where function and hence dysfunction is picked out in accordance with evolutionary theory. 
Evolutionary theory specifies the biological functions of the traits of the human mind and body. Note 
that the focus on social dysfunction in the DSM is not the same as biological dysfunction. In fact, it 
better accords with Wakefield’s invocation of harm. But central to his attempt to offer a unified 
account of both mental and physical illness, biological functions include evolutionarily selected 
mental functions, both cognitive and affective. On this model, the essential or pathogenic properties 
of a disorder can be described not just in biological terms but, more specifically, as biological 
dysfunctions explicated through evolutionary theory. (The mental character of the biological 
dysfunctions which constitute mental disorders will be discussed shortly.) In the case of illnesses 
where there remains ignorance of biological mechanisms, the idea of a pathogenic factor is an article 
of faith: a commitment to there being some universal underlying nature to the illness in question. 
Although biomedical psychiatry favours a biological characterisation of pathogenic factors, other 
candidates are possible. Consider Louis Sass’ account of Schreber’s delusions in Paradoxes of 
Delusion [Sass, 1994]. Schreber was a German judge diagnosed with dementia praecox, now classed 
as schizophrenia, who wrote a first person account of his illness, including his delusions, called 
Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, at the start of the twentieth century. Sass attempts to shed light on 
the nature of Schreber’s delusions by comparing them to philosophical solipsism. 
Solipsism is the view that the only thing that exists in the world is the self of the person who thinks 
about it. It is expressed in the necessarily first person thought: ‘Only I and my mental states exist’. 
Everything else is merely an idea (for me: one of ‘my ideas’). Solipsism is thus a form of idealism – 
according to which only ideas exist – taken to the logical limit. If everything that exists is merely an 
idea only the first person subject of thought (for me: ‘I’) can have those ideas. So only one person 
exists. This paradoxical thought is used by Sass to shed light on the paradoxical quality of 
schizophrenic delusions.  
[Schreber’s] mode of experience is strikingly reminiscent of the philosophical doctrine of 
solipsism, according to which the whole of reality, including the external world and other 
persons, is but a representation appearing to a single, individual self, namely, the self of the 
philosopher who holds the doctrine… Many of the details, complexities, and contradictions 
of Schreber’s delusional world… can be understood in the light of solipsism. [ibid: P8] 
The elucidation or understanding that Sass seeks isn’t merely aimed at one particular delusional 
experience or even at all of Schreber’s experiences considered as a whole. It is meant to shed light 
more generally on the nature of schizophrenia itself. The reason it can (according to Sass) is that the 
experiences that characterise schizophrenia derive from a general and abstract feature of rationality: 
[Madness] is, to be sure, a self-deceiving condition, but one that is generated from within 
rationality itself rather than by the loss of rationality. [ibid: P12] 
Although a general feature of rationality, Sass himself does not think that the failure within 
rationality that amounts to schizophrenia is culturally universal. Rather, he thinks that is the result 
specifically of modernism [Sass, 1992]. But if, contra Sass, solipsism were not merely the product of 
recent European culture but rather a standing universal possibility suggested by the abstract 
structure of rationality itself, then its corresponding disorder - schizophrenia – would be a risk for 
any rational subject, human or alien, whatever their biology or evolutionary history. The pathogenic 
factor is, on this model, an abstract feature of rationality rather than a particular biological process 
or dysfunction. 
Whether the pathogenic factor is thought of as a biological or a more abstract feature of rationality, 
on the pathogenic-pathoplastic model variation in general and cultural variation specifically (the 
focus here) enters with the pathoplastic factor. Culturally invariant pathologies of underlying human 
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nature are overlaid by local cultural variation in how they are expressed. ‘Expressed’ could carry 
either of two meanings. First, it might mean that standing possibilities for biological dysfunction or 
failings of rational subjectivity might be differently prompted or caused by different social or 
geographical contexts. The idea that mental illness has social determinants is, however, akin to 
socially caused variation in heart disease rates in different cultures and hardly merits the label 
‘cultural concept’.  
The more interesting idea is that variation in ‘expression’ picks out the way in which underlying 
pathologies might be plastic to the different self-interpretations that people in different cultures 
possess and thus the way the pathologies are experienced and avowed. This would be an example of 
a cultural idiom of distress in the vocabulary of the DSM-5. But whereas for physical illness, how one 
understands one’s illness might be thought to be an accidental superficiality compared with the real 
underlying condition (as understood, perhaps, by the medical profession), one might argue that for 
mental illness its esse is percipi: how it is perceived at least partly constitutes it.  
On a two-factor pathogenic-pathoplastic model, mental illnesses either are, or are underpinned by, 
pathologies of some sort of universal substrate. The difference between these options is the 
difference between thinking that the alloy of an invariant underlying pathology and a varying 
cultural overlay itself comprises what we mean by a mental illness, and on the other hand thinking 
that the mental illness proper is identical with the pathogenic factor only. 
One might think, for example, that khyal cap and panic disorder have the same underlying biological 
mechanism but that the characteristic way in which, in the former, subjects think of their distress 
through the conceptual lens of a dysfunction of the flow of wind-like substance is sufficient to mark 
it off as a different kind of mental illness from the latter. Biological dysfunction is then the common 
component of two distinct illnesses depending on cultural context. Christopher Boorse’ distinction 
between disease and illness where the latter is tied to the subject’s experience of it implies a 
difference in illness in such a case [Boorse 1975]. On the other hand, one might think that the real 
illness is whatever is common to khyal cap and panic disorder: the pathogenic factor. It is merely 
that the appearance that the single illness takes can vary.  
Whichever view is taken of whether the pathogenic factor is the illness or merely the common 
disease underpinning of different illnesses, a two-factor pathogenic-pathoplastic view of cultural 
concepts of mental illness suggests a particular view of the aim of a cultural formulation in 
psychiatric diagnosis. It is a way of inferring, from locally divergent symptoms, the universal 
underlying nature of mental illness. The aim of sensitivity to cultural difference would be to find a 
way to penetrate beneath it to a common substrate appropriate for scientific psychiatric research. 
This seems to be the view of the ex-president of the World Psychiatric Association Juan Mezzich et 
al. (2009) in their discussion of ‘Cultural formulation guidelines’ when they say: 
The cultural formulation of illness aims to summarize how the patient’s illness is enacted 
and expressed through these representations of his or her social world. [Mezzich et al 2009; 
P390] 
and 
Performing a cultural formulation of illness requires of the clinician to translate the patient’s 
information about self, social situation, health, and illness into a general biopsychosocial 
framework that the clinician uses to organize diagnostic assessment and therapeutics. In 
effect, the clinician seeks to map what he or she has learned about the patient’s illness onto 
the conceptual framework of clinical psychiatry. [ibid: P391] 
These passages suggest that there is a division between how an illness is enacted and expressed and 
the underlying biological mechanisms explored by biomedical psychiatry. The former is culturally 
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shaped, the latter is invariant. On Mezzich et al.’s (2009) account, the only positive role cultural 
factors can then play is as a source of contingent health promoting resources: 
The aim is to summarize how culturally salient themes can be used to enhance care and 
health promotion strategies (e.g., involvement of the patient’s family, utilization of helpful 
cultural values). [ibid: P399] 
In other words, ‘culturally salient themes’ do not reveal the shape of mental illnesses in themselves 
but can, contingently, be used to promote health because of their effects on how people understand 
their own illnesses. All this suggests that the underlying view of the role of cultural formulation is 
determined by a two-factor view. Such a view is, however, merely one of several possible. I will 
argue that it is a half way house between two more radical views of the possibilities for cultural 
psychiatry both of which are versions of a single factor which I will now outline. 
Two single factor models of cultural variation: pathoplastic-only and pathogenic-only 
A two-factor pathogenic-pathoplastic model of the nature of transcultural psychiatry requires a 
distinction between surface appearance and underlying pathology. But it might be that this 
distinction cannot be drawn. The various ways one might attempt to flesh out the contrast between 
underlying pathology – for example as biological or some other underpinning notion of universal 
human nature – and surface appearance might fail.  
Consider the first suggestion for the pathogenic factor outlined above: a biological process which, if 
Wakefield is right, can be more precisely specified as a harmful dysfunction analysed using 
evolutionary theory. Drawing a distinction between this and the surface appearance in the way a 
two-factor model requires might seem unproblematic for some illnesses. It requires that a common 
underlying biological dysfunction can be identified despite different culturally imposed behaviours or 
experiences. But in the case of some mental dysfunctions there may be no principled way of drawing 
a distinction between an underlying dysfunction and the surface appearance.  
To illustrate this, consider the role of biological processes. It seems plausible to assume mental 
functions and dysfunctions depend, in potentially complicated ways, on human brains. Thus there 
may be common biological processes underpinning common mental dysfunctions. But one cannot 
treat just any shared biological process as the first factor of a mental illness. The biological process 
has to be a mental process: a failure of a mental function. It is then much less clear how there can be 
shared mental dysfunctions between different manifestations. The dysfunction may be located only 
at the surface mental level. 
The potential difficulty of dividing between underlying pathology and surface appearance can also 
be described without talk of mental functions. The philosopher John McDowell argues that human 
nature can be divided between two distinct levels: biological nature and a 'second nature' that has 
to be developed through education and enculturation [McDowell 1994; P183]. A good example is 
initiation into a first language. Whilst the ability to develop a second nature is contingent on 
biological first nature, biology alone is not enough. This suggests the possibility of two kinds of 
mental illness. So called ‘organic’ illnesses, such as dementia or alcohol syndromes, are those with a 
clear biological or first nature component. But ‘functional’ disorders are, on this view, disorders only 
of second nature. In the latter case, it is unclear how to distinguish between the surface appearance 
of mental illness, its characteristic experiences or manifestations, for example, and an underlying 
mental process. Mental illness – or at least some mental illnesses – may be features of the surface 
appearance of our second nature.  
If the distinction between the two levels on which the two-factor pathogenic-pathoplastic model 
depends cannot be drawn for at least some mental illnesses that leaves only a single factor. There 
are, however, two possible one-factor models depending on whether one thinks of illness as all 
pathogenic or all pathoplastic. 
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A one-factor model need not imply that there is any substantial cultural variation of mental illness 
beyond prevalence rates. Cultural factors might play a role in causing different rates of illness in 
different communities without this making the nature of illness in any sense relative to a culture. 
Using McDowell’s vocabulary, this might be because human second nature is itself universal. Or, 
using Wakefield’s model, it might be because the mental dysfunctions that constitute illnesses are 
universal. A pathogenic-only model holds that illness varies only in external features such as rates 
and superficial and unimportant local understandings of it. Any apparent deeper variation would be 
a mark of our ignorance, our misdiagnosis. So a pathogenic-only model has no need for a cultural 
formulation to extract or excavate the underlying commonalities because they are open to view. 
But, following the account suggested in this chapter of the distinction between pathogenic and 
pathoplastic not in terms of the causes of mental illness but their essential and universal properties, 
it is possible to articulate a radical pathoplastic-only model. According to this, there might be no 
shared pathogenic factor between apparently different mental illnesses in different cultures. 
Cultural variation might go ‘all the way down’. Genuinely different forms of mental illness would 
emerge from different ways of living in different societies. It would thus be a ‘category fallacy’, in 
Arthur Kleinman’s phrase, to assume that a form of illness found in one culture must, in principle, 
have application in another [Kleinman, 1977]. 
To flesh this example out it will be helpful to consider again Sass’ account of schizophrenia. The 
symptoms of schizophrenia are a kind of lived experience of the philosophical theory of solipsism. 
Sass thus claims that schizophrenic delusion is generated from within rationality itself rather than by 
the loss of rationality. That basic idea can be used to illustrate both the pathogenic-only and the 
pathoplastic-only models of cultural idioms of distress.  
If one thinks that the history of Western philosophy merely illustrates and unpacks conceptual 
connections implicit in the rationality of any possible thinker – human or even alien – then solipsism 
is also a standing possibility for anyone and hence, on Sass’ account, so is schizophrenia as its lived 
version. That is the pathogenic-only model. Any apparent culturally determined local variation in the 
experience of schizophrenia, such as the specific contents of delusions by contrast with invariant 
forms, would be merely superficial, requiring no great cultural sensitivity to detect. It is the thought 
that it is merely or trivially superficial which distinguishes this from a two-factor model with its 
demand for a cultural formulation to penetrate surface features. 
If, on the other hand, one thinks with Sass himself, that Western philosophy has been driven not 
merely by the abstract demands of rationality but by historically contingent assumptions about the 
nature of mind, world and subjectivity then the temptation towards solipsism will seem to be a 
merely local cultural matter. At the risk of over simplifying Sass’ view, if the intellectual movement of 
Modernism had not existed then there would have been no such thing as schizophrenia [Sass 1992]. 
This is a pathoplastic-only view because it implies that there need be no common elements to the 
mental illnesses experienced in different cultures. (This is not to say that such illness is uncaused. On 
the gloss offered in this chapter, pathogenic versus pathoplastic concerns what is essential and 
universal versus what is accidental rather than what causes mental illness.) 
The pathoplastic-only model is more radical than the two-factor model even though both agree on 
the need for some sort of cultural formulation. A pathoplastic-only version of a cultural formulation 
does not enable one to dig beneath surface difference to find underlying common pathologies but 
would instead be an articulation of the genuinely different ways people can be ill in different 
cultures. According to it, there are genuinely different forms of mental illness which need have 
nothing substantial in common across different cultures. The virtues of the validity of a psychiatric 
taxonomy and its universality diverge. 
In fact, sympathy for a pathoplastic-only view of mental illness sometimes seems to go hand in hand 
with a view that questions the illness-status of cultural idioms of distress. For example, Littlewood’s 
anthropological comparison of female overdosing in Anglo-American society with the behavioural 
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patterns of women in ‘less pluralistic small-scale societies’ looking ‘not just at the person involved 
but at the local meaning of the act in the political context in which it happens’ suggests a social 
function rather than an individual pathology [Littlewood 2002: P36]. It may be that the pathoplastic-
only model requires an anthropological stance and that such a stance looks for and tends to find 
social order rather than individual illness or disorder. But that is not an essential feature of a 
pathoplastic-only approach. There is nothing inconsistent with the idea that a pathoplastic-only 
model is a model of illness.  
The status of khyal cap 
The first section of this chapter introduced but left hanging the question of whether the presence in 
the DSM-5 of the ‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’ implied a kind of anthropological 
relativism or whether it is consistent with the privileging of a particular cultural standpoint: that of 
twenty-first century biomedical psychiatry. The example of khyal cap was used to highlight the issue 
since it involves a distinct view of physiology which includes the flow of a wind-like substance along 
the blood vessels and normally, harmless, out through the skin.  
In its case, at first sight no such relativism seems necessary given the definitions of cultural 
syndrome, idiom of distress and explanation set out in DSM-5 [APA 2013: 14]. Khyal cap can serve as 
an ‘idiom of distress’: the conception of an experience had by a subject. If someone describes their 
experience as the rising up of a wind-like substance then that is simply an anthropological fact about 
the culture. It can serve as a ‘cultural explanation’ because, again, that is a fact about how a culture 
explains particular experiences without implicit endorsement of that theory of aetiology by the 
sufferer?. But, by the standards of twenty-first century western psychiatry, it can even be described 
as a ‘cultural syndrome’ since that is defined as ‘a cluster or group of co-occurring, relatively 
invariant symptoms found in a specific cultural group, community, or context’. If, for whatever 
reason, the symptoms described co-occur then it is reasonable to call them ‘khyal cap’. In other 
words, the sincere use of ‘khyal cap’ by a cross-cultural psychiatrist need not cause any intellectual 
difficulty. 
But such a reading of the description carries some implications when it comes to understanding the 
nature of culturally sensitive psychiatry. If the concept of a khyal attack is only ever used within the 
context of what someone from that culture believes – his or her conception of the nature and 
explanation of their experiences – rather than as an objective description of what is really causing 
the attack, then that suggests a distinction of kind between cultural concepts of distress and the 
main elements of DSM-5’s taxonomy.  
Consider the question asked from a biomedical psychiatric standpoint: ‘But from what are they really 
suffering?’. The description above suggests a ready answer selected from the list of related 
conditions in DSM-5: ‘Panic attack, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, 
posttraumatic stress disorder, illness anxiety disorder’. Such a response suggests that a culturally 
sensitive psychiatry might be merely a sensitivity to other cultures’ errors: the truthful ascription of a 
false belief about the causes of abnormal experiences.  
With that worry in the background, consider the example of khyal attack through the range of 
options explored above. Recall Mezzich et al’s (2009) suggestion that the role of a cultural 
formulation is to ‘map what he or she has learned about the patient’s illness onto the conceptual 
framework of clinical psychiatry’. This reflects a two-factor model. If applied to this case, the 
underlying invariant pathogenic factor is whatever is picked out by ‘panic attack, panic disorder, 
generalized anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, posttraumatic stress disorder, [or] illness anxiety 
disorder’. The varying local cultural shape is the ‘catastrophic cognitions centered on the concern 
that khyal (a windlike substance) may rise in the body’. Fitting khyal attack into the two-factor model 
does nothing to address the underlying worry, however, because there remains an asymmetry 
between it and panic attack. From the perspective of the rest of the DSM, the former, but not the 
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latter, involves an error about the real aetiology of the condition. Dividing the condition between 
two-factors does nothing to change this perspective. 
Nor does it help to adopt the pathogenic-only model. That model presents a stark choice for any 
putative newly discovered mental illness. Cultural syndromes such as khyal cap can have either of 
two statuses. They are either really other names for universal conditions also picked out by the 
vocabulary of biomedical psychiatry such as ‘panic disorder’. Or they do not exist. For example, if it is 
an essential part of the theoretical apparatus of khyal cap that it is caused by the rising up of a wind-
like substance then given that on our best account of physiology there is no such substance then, 
equally, there is no such condition. Those who self-report it, or its characteristic symptoms, are in 
some sense in error about their own conditions. Again the underlying worry is not addressed. 
Could khyal cap be understood in accord with the pathoplastic-only model? In rejecting the 
traditional two-factor model of cross-cultural psychiatry (then generally called ‘transcultural 
psychiatry’ [Littlewood 1986a: 38]) anthropologically minded psychiatrists such as Roland Littlewood 
and Arthur Kleinman have implicitly favoured a pathoplastic-only model [eg Littlewood 1985, 1986, 
2002].  
[C]ulture-bound syndromes are representations in the individual of symbolic themes 
concerning social relations and which occur in certain personal and historical situations. 
They articulate both personal predicament and public concerns by means of which women 
and other depressed categories exert mystical pressure upon their superiors in 
circumstances of deprivation and frustration when few other sanctions are available to 
them’ [Littlewood 1985: 704] 
Such a view plays down the illness status of the behaviour and emphasises instead its positive social 
function in addressing an imbalance of power. In his paper ‘The culture-bound syndromes of the 
dominant culture’, Littlewood applies the same style of analysis onto diagnoses found in the main 
sections of DSM. Agoraphobia, for example, is argued to serve an adaptive function for a woman 
against her husband without open defiance, binding them both together at home [Littlewood and 
Lipsedge 1986: 262-3]. 
So it might seem that a pathoplastic-only approach can address a worry about the asymmetric 
treatment of syndromes in the main body of the DSM and the appendix. If the same pathoplastic-
only approach is taken to the syndromes set out in the rest of DSM-5 then it seems that those in the 
‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’ have the same status. But there is a cost to this. It is not 
that an ironic attitude to the cultural concepts is avoided. It is rather that it is generalised to include 
diagnoses favoured by biomedical psychiatry for example: agoraphobia, anorexia nervosa. In any 
case, debunking psychiatric syndromes set out in the main body of the DSM by arguing that they are 
really meaning-laden adaptive strategies rather than genuine pathologies may be plausible in some 
cases (perhaps ADHD, personality disorder, depression following bereavement). But it seems 
implausible across the board. A globally critical attitude to every mental illness syndrome is a high 
price to pay for affording cultural concepts equal status. 
But, as was argued above, a pathoplastic-only approach need not deny the pathological status of 
conditions in favour of adaptive social functions. An anthropological investigation could be of 
different forms of illness. On a pathoplastic-only approach, this requires some universal concept of 
illness in general whilst denying that illnesses need be universal. Jerome Wakefield analysis of illness 
as harmful dysfunction provides one such universal standard [Wakefield 1999]. Bill Fulford argues 
that illness is value-laden failure of ordinary doing [Fulford 1989]. Either of these general accounts of 
the concept of illness could serve for an anthropological investigation of cultural variations in forms 
of illness. Behaviour which amounts to agoraphobia in the UK might involve no failure of ordinary 
doing in a culture in which a sub-population is not expected to venture outside, for example. 
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Despite the possibility of a pathoplastic-only approach to local conceptions of pathology (rather than 
socially adaptive functions), this does not help in the case of khyal cap. The problem is that it 
involves not just a description of a local failure of function or action. In fact, the possibility of 
construing it as a variant of panic attack or disorder suggests a continuity of the kind of failure of 
function or action that it embodies with those recognised in the main body of the DSM. Rather, the 
main difference lies within the local aetiological theory. But this is not merely different from but 
rather incompatible with the view of the body contained within biomedical psychiatry. Espousing 
both a traditional biomedical view in the main body of the text and an incompatible view in the 
appendix threatens the validity of one or the other. They cannot both be set out as true accounts. 
Conclusion 
One of the criticisms of western psychiatry has been its cultural narrow mindedness, reflecting a 
particular socio-cultural perspective but without realising this. Littlewood, for example, argues in 
Pathologies of the West, that psychiatry has often assumed that experience of mental illness in 
America and Europe is more purely pathogenic whilst other cultures embody a kind of error: ‘a poor 
imitation of European forms’ [Littlewood 2002: 10]. The fact that DSM-5 has more explicitly 
addressed the nature of cultural idioms of mental distress than previous editions might suggest 
progress has been made in addressing this criticism. 
Despite this, however, there remain tensions within the DSM in accommodating the cultural 
concepts of distress. As the example of khyal cap illustrates, they can be framed in local aetiological 
theories or local accounts of physiology which are incompatible from the views of biomedical 
psychiatry expressed in the main body of the text. None of the three models of the relation of 
disorder to culture helps.  
To summarise: on a pathogenic-only view, cultural idioms of distress accord with DSM categories, 
correct or augment them or embody errors. But the model rules out the idea of cultural variation. 
The traditional two factor pathogenic-pathoplastic model allows that khyal cap may contain a 
genuine pathogenic core, which reflects diagnostic categories from the main body of the DSM, but 
the difference in physiological theory corresponding to the idea of windflow along the blood vessels 
is a local, pathoplastic error. Whilst it is true that those self-ascribing khyal cap are distressed it is 
not true that this results from dysfunction of an inner wind. The more radical pathoplastic-only 
model suggests the possibility of genuinely distinct conditions in virtue of different conceptions of 
flourishing, or ordinary actions, or societal functions (depending on the view taken of the concept of 
disorder). Such a view contains a variety of relativism. To be ill is relative to the practices or 
functions or actions of a local culture. But there is no reason to think that the truths of human 
physiology are in that sense relative to local cultures. And hence the pathoplastic-only model is no 
help in accommodating khyal cap. 
This result is, perhaps, unsurprising. Although these cultural concepts of distress are flagged in the 
Introduction and discussed in the main body of DSM-5, their articulation and description is restricted 
to an appendix. They do not form a part of the taxonomy of mental illnesses proper whose aims 
include validity.  
Discussion of the abstract models of ‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’ does, however, 
suggest two different approaches to the relation between future psychiatric taxonomies and 
anthropological investigation. On a pathogenic-only or a two-factor pathogenic-pathoplastic view, a 
completed psychiatric taxonomy would contain a finite number of underlying universal conditions, 
overlain, according to the latter view by different culturally imposed appearances. But on a 
pathoplastic-only model there are as many possible illnesses as there are ways of being unable to 
take part in local ways of life or local conceptions of flourishing. This challenges the idea of universal 
diagnostic categories. A compendious version of the DSM would have to chart conditions that, by 
virtue of their local cultural origins, would not be applicable globally. Given that the arguments for or 
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against any one of the different views of cultural concepts do not produce clear results, this remains 
a live possibility. 
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